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ABSTRACT
Colombia’s unemployment rate rose to 20% during the late 1990s from less than 8% in 1994. This
paper argues that this has been the result of high non-wage labor costs embodied in the legislation.
The estimated own-wage labor demand elasticity is around –0.5, which implies that a reduction in
those costs, while politically costly, can have a significant payoff in terms of equity and efficiency.
We also find that adjustment costs of changing employment as well as wage elasticities were not
affected by changes in the regulations regarding severance payments and dismissal costs. In this
sense, structural reforms did have an impact on labor demand through its effect on relative prices
alone. Finally, we conclude that the wage elasticity of labor demand increases (in absolute terms)















In spite of a labor reform introduced in 1990, as part of a reform package that liberalized 
the economy in many dimensions
1, Colombia’s urban unemployment reached an unprecedented 
20% by the end of that decade. The 1990 reform made labor contracts more flexible, including a 
reduction in job security provisions. The most significant change took place in relation to 
severance payments with the introduction of a system of individual accounts managed by 
specialized private funds. Under the old system, employers managed the funds and employees 
were allowed to make partial withdrawals at any time. At the time of separation, those 
withdrawals were debited in nominal terms, adding to the costs faced by employers. In practice, 
the new system implied a reduction in the level and uncertainty of severance payments for firms. 
In fact, the initial effect of the reform was to lower non-wage labor costs to 42.9% of the basic 
wage, from 47.1% during the late 1980s. However, the reform did not deal with other important 
areas of labor legislation, especially payroll taxation
2.  
The reform package also included a Social Security law, enacted in 1993, which raised 
employers’ mandatory contributions for health and pension programs. From the viewpoint of the 
labor market, this reform had important implications resulting from the significant increase in 
non-wage labor costs. In fact, by 1996 non-wage labor costs had risen to 52% of the basic salary, 
an increase of nearly 10 percentage points relative to their level in 1991.  
This paper analyzes the combined effect of these two reforms on labor demand
3. The 
                                                 
1 The reforms of the early 1990s were introduced mainly as a result of low growth during the 1980s, combined with an 
election turnout that gave President César Gaviria, a convinced reformist, a significant majority in congress. 
2 The reform kept a 9% payroll tax earmarked for labor training by SENA  (2%), social welfare programs for the 
unprotected childhood by ICBF (3%), and family subsidies provided by the privately managed Cajas de Compensación 
(4%). 
3 Kugler (in this volume) analyzes the effects of changes in job security provisions, such as severance payments and 
other dismissal costs, on labor turnover.   3
results indicate that the increase in labor costs resulting from the pension and health reform had a 
negative impact on labor demand. Thus, the paper calls for a new generation of labor market 
reform in Colombia, aimed at reducing non-wage labor costs.  
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 discusses the institutional and 
regulatory framework governing the labor market, with special attention to the changes 
introduced in the 1990 and 1993 reforms. Particular emphasis is placed on measuring the non-
wage costs implied by the regulation. Section 3 shows the main stylized facts in the labor market 
between 1976 and 1996. Section 4 deals with the incidence of payroll taxation on wages in a 
framework that analyzes the possible endogeneity of wage and non-wage labor costs. More 
specifically, the section tests whether higher non-wage costs faced by employers have been 
transferred to workers in the form of lower basic wages. The results suggest that firms do not 
lower wages when facing higher non-wage labor costs resulting from the legislation. The paper 
then moves to the analysis of labor demand. Section 5 estimates standard labor demand 
equations with the time series data. The emphasis of the estimation is placed on the measurement 
of the own-wage elasticities, as well as the elasticities of substitution between different factors of 
production. It also tests for possible changes in the value of those elasticities, associated with the 
reform package of the early 1990s
4. Section 6 presents the results of estimating the determinants 
of labor demand in a dynamic framework that considers explicitly the impact of the regulations 
on the path of employment adjustment. Sections 7 and 8 present the results of labor demand 
estimations based on panels of manufacturing establishments and sectors, respectively. Section 9 
concludes. 
                                                 
4 Trade liberalization was an essential part of the package. As is well known, trade liberalization can make labor demand 
more elastic by making output markets more competitive and by making domestic labor more substitutable with foreign 
factors. Or in the words of Hicks (1964, p. 242), “the demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more elastic is 
demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce”.      4
The main conclusions of the paper are the following. First, labor demand elasticities in Colombia 
are around –0.5, a value that is not low
5 (in absolute terms) by international standards. Ceteris 
paribus, the increase in labor costs has resulted in a significant reduction in labor demand. The 
message is that the payoff, in terms of greater employment, of a reduction in payroll taxes is 
considerable.  Second, adjustment costs of changing employment as well as wage elasticities 
were not affected by changes in the regulations regarding severance payments and dismissal 
costs. In this sense, structural reforms did have an impact on labor demand through its effect on 
relative prices alone. Finally, we conclude that the wage elasticity of labor demand increases (in 
absolute terms) during contractions. Hence, the increase in prices and the beginning of a 
recession had a significant effect on employment. 
 
2. LABOR LEGISLATION: RECENT CHANGES 
As mentioned in the introduction, the regulation of the labor market in Colombia saw 
important changes during the 1990s. This section summarizes key aspects of the 1990 labor 
reform and the reform to the social security system that was enacted in 1993
6. 
•  Severance pay was the highest non-wage labor cost under the pre-1990 regime. Employees 
were entitled to one-month salary per year of work (based on the last salary). Partial 
withdrawals were allowed and deducted in nominal terms from the final payment, implying a 
form of “double retroactivity” (with an estimated cost of 4.2% of the total wage bill)
7. The 
new legislation eliminated this extra cost in all new labor contracts and introduced a monthly 
contribution (9.3% of the basic salary) to a capitalized fund in the workers’ name accessible in 
the event of separation or retirement. Thus, the reform effectively reduced the level and 
uncertainty of the costs associated with severance payments.  
                                                 
5 Assuming that all the increase in taxes and contributions implied an increase in labor costs. 
6 See Lora and Henao (1995), Cárdenas and Gutiérrez (1996), Lora and Pagés (1997), and Guash (1997).   5
•  The reform increased the indemnity paid to workers dismissed without “just cause”. Workers 
with less than a year of tenure on the job receive 45 days' wages. Workers with more than one 
year of tenure receive 45 days for the first year plus an additional amount for each extra year, 
which implied an increase relative to the old regime. For example, in the event of separation, 
a worker with more than 10 years of tenure on the job used to receive 30 days for each extra 
year (after the first). As can be seen in Table A1, the new legislation increased the indemnity 
to the equivalent of 40 days' wages per additional year
8. Although the legal definition of “just 
cause” was widened, the reform increased the costs of dismissal.  
 
•  However, the right of workers with more than 10 years tenure to sue for reinstatement was 
eliminated. Prior to the reform, successful plaintiffs could oblige firms to rehire workers with 
back pay. 
 
•  Workers earning more than 10 minimum wages were allowed to opt for a new contract 
(“integral salaries”) with higher wages instead of severance pay and other mandatory benefits 
(such as the especial bonus or ‘prima’). However, in a survey conducted by Fedesarrollo in 
1994, manufacturing firms reported that less than 2% of the employees had this type of 
contract. 
 
•  Labor contracts for less than one year were allowed (renewable up to three times under the 
same terms
9), provided that all benefits are paid in proportion to the duration of the contract. 
 
•  Legal restrictions on the creation of labor unions were lifted. In particular, the Ministry of 
Labor lost discretionary powers in this regard. Also, it became unlawful for employers to 
discourage the creation of labor unions. A minimum of 25 workers is still necessary to form a 
union. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Apart from tenure, the real cost of termination of employment increased with the frequency of partial withdrawals, 
uncertain to the employer. 
8 Based on the highest salary during the last year of employment. 
9 The fourth renovation has to be made for at least one year. See Farné and Nupia (1996).   6
•  The 1993 social security and health reform (Law 100) increased total contributions for health 
from 7% of the basic salary (until 1994) to 8% in 1995 and 12% afterwards. One-third of the 
total contribution has to be paid by the employer (same proportion as in the old system).  
 
•  The same law increased pension contributions to 13.5% in 1996 (14.5% for workers that earn 
more than four minimum wages) from 8% of the basic salary in 1993. The increase was 
implemented gradually. Contributions were first raised to 11.5% in April 1994 and then to 
12.5% in 1995. Employers currently pay 10.1 percentage points of the total contribution, as 
opposed 4.3 before the reform
10. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the effects of labor and social security reform on non-wage labor 
costs. Total non-wage labor cost paid by the firm (as a percentage of the basic salary) rose to 
52% after the 1993 pension reform from 42.9% after the 1990 labor reform. For the purpose of 
the analysis, we divide non-wage costs into three relatively arbitrary categories: First, “deferred 
wages” which include vacations, extra bonuses, pension and health contributions. In theory, 
deferred wages affect the total labor cost but do not have an impact on the path of employment 
adjustment. Second, severance payments, which in addition to the direct impact on labor costs, 
affect the dynamics of employment adjustment
11. Third, payroll taxes that fund programs with 
benefits that cannot be fully internalized by the employee (e.g., ICBF, SENA, and Cajas)
12. The 
economic response to these three types of non-wage costs may be different. In the case of 
deferred wages the employer can offset part of the cost by adjusting the wage. This may not be 
the case of payroll taxes earmarked for the provision of public goods. In the fourth section we 
analyze the possible effect of deferred wages on current wages by estimating a Mincer-type 
                                                 
10 Law 100 (1993) eliminated the monopoly of the Social Security Institute (ISS) in the provision of health and pensions. 
The coverage of health services was extended to the whole family and to low-income groups that were unattended under 
the previous system. In relation to the pension system, employees were given the option of choosing between the old 
pay-as-you-go system or the new fully funded system provided by private pension funds. 
11 Strictly speaking, severance payments are also deferred wages.   7
income equation. The hypothesis is that the employer may transfer non-wage costs to workers 
through lower wages. 
The upper panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of severance payments, as well as health 
and pension contributions for an average worker as percentage of the basic wage between 1976 
and 1996
13. The middle panel shows the evolution of payroll taxes. These taxes increased by one 
percentage point in 1982 (earmarked to SENA) and again by an equal amount in 1989 
(earmarked for ICBF). Vacations and extra bonuses have remained constant throughout the 
period. The bottom panel adds all these costs together. The cumulative effect shows an 
increasing trend until 1990. After the 1990 labor reform, non-wage labor costs fell as a result of 
the changes introduced to the legislation related to severance payments. However, since 1994 
these costs have increased sharply as a result of the 1993 health and pension reforms. 
 
3. STYLIZED FACTS 
Figure 2 displays the unemployment rate for the period 1976-1998. After reaching a peak 
in March 1986 (14.6%), unemployment rates declined steadily until 1994 when they were under 
8%. Unemployment rates have increased sharply since 1995. The figure for September 2000 
(20.5%) is the highest in the modern Colombian economic history. Although much of the 
explanation of greater unemployment is related to significant increases in labor supply, this paper 
argues that labor demand cannot be ignored. In fact, the increase in the cost of labor -combined 
with a relatively high own wage elasticity- had a negative impact on labor demand. However, 
this is not the only explanation. The 1990 labor reform has also caused greater employment 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Of course, if the linkage between payroll taxes is weak or if the external benefits of social security programs are 
significant, then partial or complete finance by general revenues may be appropriate. See Kesselman (1995). 
13 Workers under “integral salaries” are excluded. After 1991 we ignore workers under pre-1990 contractual terms.    8
volatility in response to economy-wide shocks. This has been the result of greater flexibility in 
the creation and destruction of jobs. Kugler (in this volume) addresses this issue in detail. 
  This paper uses mainly data on output, employment (skilled and unskilled) and wages for 
Colombia’s seven largest cities. These variables are available for seven sectors: (1) 
manufacturing, (2) electricity and gas, (3) construction, (4) retail, restaurants and hotels, (5) 
transportation and communications, (6) financial services, and (7) personal and government 
services. The data come from the quarterly National Household Survey (NHS), which has been 
conducted uninterruptedly since 1976. Output data come from the quarterly GDP series 
processed by DNP. 
 
Employment and Production 
Table 1 displays some basic descriptive statistics on urban employment for the period 
1976-1996. Manufacturing and personal and governmental services provide 29% and 25% of the 
urban jobs, respectively. We use information only for wage earners, which account for 64% of 
the total urban workers (62% before the 1990 labor reform). However, there are sharp 
differences across sectors. In manufacturing, 76% of the workers earn a monetary wage, while in 
retail and restaurants only 50% of the workers do.  
We use a measure of skill that includes high school graduates plus all of those with some 
tertiary education (all workers with 12 or more years of schooling). By using this definition, the 
group of more educated workers represented 23% of urban employment on average between 
1992 and 1996. According to Figure 3, this group’s share in total urban employment has 
increased steadily since 1976, reflecting the greater educational attainment of the population. 
Indeed, average years of schooling have increased continuously during the past two decades. As   9
can be seen in Table 1, skilled workers represent more than 30% of total employment in public 
utilities, financial services, and personal and government services. These shares have increased 
significantly since 1992. 
Figure 4 describes the evolution of employment and production in the Colombian urban 
sector. It is interesting to note that after 1991 skilled employment has grown faster than unskilled 
employment is most sectors. This has been particularly true in the case of manufacturing, where 
employment of unskilled workers has fallen in absolute terms since 1993. The same trend is 
observed in the construction sector after 1994. These two sectors combined employ 
approximately 35% of the unskilled wage earners in the urban regions. 
 
Factor Prices 
Information about labor income received by wage earners (skilled and unskilled) comes 
from the National Household Survey. Given that this is not necessarily equal to the total labor 
cost paid by the employer (which is the relevant price in the estimation of labor demand) it is 
then necessary to quantify non-wage labor costs and construct a measure of the total labor cost. 
We do that by using the information contained in Figure 1, which summarizes all non-wage labor 
costs, expressed as a percentage of the basic salary. This includes severance payments, payroll 
taxes, and contributions for health and pensions on the part of the employer.  
It is not entirely clear whether income reported by the individuals surveyed in the NHS 
includes benefits such as vacations, mandatory bonuses and severance payments. Nonetheless, it 
is probably safe to assume that individuals report their basic pre-tax salary, without benefits. In 
order to obtain the total labor cost we add all the non-wage labor costs measured in Figure 1 to 
the basic salary reported in the NHS. Implicitly, this means assuming the independence of wage   10
and non-wage costs. We do this based on the results of the next section, which support the idea 
that employees do not transfer higher non-wage costs imposed by the legislation through lower 
basic salaries. Finally, the overall cost is then deflated using the Producers Price Index. The 
procedure is identical for skilled and unskilled workers
14. For completeness, we also report the 
user cost of capital measured according to a standard methodology described in Cárdenas y 
Gutiérrez (1996)
15. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of real factor costs by sector. There are three key insights 
for the 1990s: First, the cost of labor increased significantly; second, the cost of labor increased 
faster than the cost of capital; third, the cost of skilled relative to unskilled labor rose during this 
period. In fact, the user cost of capital decreased considerably during the period 1992-1994 as a 
result of the reduction in the interest rate and the real currency appreciation. As shown in Table 2 
the average annual growth in real labor costs between 1992 and 1996 was 11.4% for skilled 
workers and 8.4% for unskilled workers. These rates are substantially higher than the average for 
the pre-reform period. In sum, labor costs increased in an unprecedented way after 1990, 
especially in the case of skilled workers. 
 
4. Endogeneity of Wage and Non-wage Costs. 
As mentioned above, we need to support our assumption that wage and non-wage costs 
can be added together ignoring the incidence of payroll taxation on wages. Several authors have 
warned against this assumption, arguing that wages and non-wage costs are endogenously 
determined. This is the case of Newell and Symons (1987) for the European context and in 
                                                 
14 As mentioned in Section 2, workers with high remuneration (over 10 minimum wages) under ‘integral salaries’ 
contracts have much lower non-wage costs (33.8% of the basic salary vs. 52% in contracts with full benefits). However, 
the NHS survey does not provide information on the contract type so we assume that all workers are paid full benefits.    11
Gruber (1995) for Chile. Their view is that ignoring this issue can be misleading when making 
policy recommendations.  
There are different ways to deal with this potential endogeneity. Some authors estimate 
an equation of the wage rate as a function of the payroll tax rate and a constant. If the coefficient 
on the payroll tax rate variable is equal to –1, then they conclude that taxes are fully shifted into 
wages. This is the procedure used by Gruber (1995). 
Here we adopt a somewhat different procedure. We estimate the determinants of wages 
based on information from the National Household Surveys. Every two years (in June) the NHS 
includes a special module on informality where workers report whether they are covered by the 
social security system. We use the data from the June 1988, 1992 and 1996 surveys (including 
the special module) to estimate a Mincer-type income equation. The regressions are based on 
data for each one of the surveyed workers and allow us to understand whether an individual's 
wage, given certain personal characteristics, is negatively affected when the individual 
contributes to the social security system
16. 
Our assumption is that if employers transfer the non-wage labor cost to employees, then 
workers that are registered in the social security system would have lower wages (after 
controlling for other personal characteristics that may affect wages) than those that are not 
registered in the social security system







i o t city mw dumss mw dumss pers w ε β β β β β β β + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ sec * ln 7 6 5     (1) 
where pers is a vector of personal characteristics that include average years of schooling, gender, 
and experience; dumss is a dummy variable which takes a unitary value when the individual is 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Our measure of the user cost of capital is higher than the one obtained by Pombo (1997), who estimates the 
depreciation rates (and the corresponding tax deductions) for different asset types in the manufacturing sector. 
16 The percentage of workers with health coverage rose to 60% in 1996 from 50% in 1988.   12
registered in the social security system (i.e. the employer pays social security contributions); mw 
is a dummy variable that controls for individuals that earn the minimum wage
18 (payroll taxes 
cannot be transferred to these workers in the form of lower wages); sec is a vector of dummy 
variables that account for 9 economic sectors and city is a vector of dummy variables for each of 
the seven main cities. 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1). The adjustment of the regression 
is high (R-squares are around 0.55) given the total number of observations (approximately 
25.000 depending on the year). The personal characteristics variables appear with the correct 
sign and are statistically significant. In particular, returns to education are positive (but low) and 
the coefficient is highly significant. The positive coefficient of the dummy variable for gender 
indicates that given other personal characteristics, labor income is relatively higher for men. In 
turn, experience has a positive but decreasing impact on wages. According to the sign of the 
coefficient, individuals that earn the minimum wage have lower incomes than what would be 
predicted by their personal characteristics. The dummy variables that account for the economic 
sectors and the city of location also come out significant. 
Turning to the variables of interest for this exercise, for a given set of personal 
characteristics, workers covered by the social security system have higher wages than uncovered 
workers. This is of interest because it suggests that employers might not transfer social security 
contributions to workers in the form of lower wages. However, it is possible that social security 
contributions are proxying for self-selection and unobserved characteristics of the workers, 
biasing the results. Thus, it is unclear whether the results of this section provide the necessary 
support in order to use our measure total labor costs, which is simply the sum of wage and non-
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Ribero and Meza (1997) and Sánchez and Núñez (1998) have estimated Mincer-type income equations for Colombia. 
18 For the purpose of this exercise, the minimum wage in 1988 was $28.000, in 1992 $72.000 and in 1996 $155.000.   13
wage costs (self-selection may be hiding the true effect of endogeneity bias). We take a 
pragmatic approach and estimate the labor demand equations with only wages, and compare the 
results with regressions that include both wages and non-wage costs added together.  
 
5. STATIC LABOR DEMAND 
The purpose of this section is to measure the own wage elasticities of the demand for 
labor, as well as the elasticities of substitution between different factors of production
19. The 
literature is rich in terms of functional forms that can be used for the estimation. If changes in the 
elasticity of substitution are of interest, the Generalized Leontief (GL) function is a common 
choice. The GL specification is also normally used when information is available for more than 
two factors of production
20. 
The derived factor demands from a GL cost function (see Appendix 1) can be written as: 






















where xit is the quantity of factor i used in period t, yt is output in period t,  pit is the price of input 
i in period t, and t is a time trend. Changes in the input-output ratio can be the result of: (a) 
changes in relative factor prices; (b) changes in the scale of production (if the production 
function is not homothetic); and (c) technological change. Diewert (1971) has shown that the GL 
cost function corresponds to a fixed coefficients technology (no factor substitution) if bij = 0 for 
all i ≠  j. Also, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale if α i = 0 for all i (i.e., the 
function is homothetic). Clearly, factor-augmenting technological change does not occur if γ i = 0 
                                                 
19 Defined as the effect of a change in relative factor prices on relative input use of the two factors, holding output and 
other factor prices constant. 
20 See Hamermesh (1986).   14
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In turn, the Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of substitution between input i and input j (σ ij =  σ ji) 
can be easily calculated. The appropriate expressions in the case of the GL technology are (sj is 
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for all i ≠  j. In this case, the elasticity of substitution is not constant across time. In fact, as can be 
observed in equation (4), its value depends on the inputs quantities and prices. Finally, the 








ε + = .   (5) 
Thus, when the technology exhibits constant returns to scale the output elasticity is equal to one. 
 
RESULTS 
This section summarizes the main results of the estimation of static labor demand 
equations with quarterly data from the urban Household Surveys. The estimation is carried out 
first with data for the manufacturing sector alone, based on a system of two equations for the 
demand of skilled and unskilled labor. The equations use the number of hours worked as the 
dependent variable. We then turn to the data for the seven largest metropolitan cities, using a   15
similar framework but dropping capital as a factor of production. In both cases we deal with 
specifications that use relative input prices (skilled and unskilled labor), so the effects of non 
wage labor costs vanish (percentage-wise their impact is identical for each type of labor).  
 
MANUFACTURING 
  Table 4 presents the results on the factor demands for skilled and unskilled labor.
21 
According to the GL specification, the system of two equations describing the behavior of the 
input-output ratios was estimated using a (Gauss) Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
Procedure (FIML). In order to correct for first order serial autocorrelation of the error the lagged 
residuals were added to each equation (AR1).  
  The system was estimated with and without the symmetry restrictions (bij = bji). 
Conveniently, Theil has shown that minus twice the log of the likelihood ratio (i.e. maximum of 
the likelihood function imposing symmetry over the maximum of the likelihood function in the 
unconstrained case) has a Chi-square (χ
2) distribution (with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of restrictions imposed)
22. The test rejected the null hypothesis of symmetry. Also, in the 
estimations the coefficient γ i came out not significantly different from zero rejecting the 
hypothesis of factor-augmenting technological progress. 
 The  estimated  bij’s (excluding the trend term from the equations) are significantly 
different from zero, rejecting the existence of a fixed proportion technology (a Leontief 
production function). Importantly, the signs of the coefficients indicate that the two types of 
labor are substitutes. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale is also rejected at high levels of 
significance. The estimated α i coefficients are all positive and significant. This implies that both 
                                                 
21 In this case, we are using total labor costs as the relevant price, i.e., salary plus non-wage costs. 
22 See López (1980).   16
employment/output ratios increase as the scale of production is expanded (i.e. the production 
function is non-homothetic). 
Based on the estimated bij’s we then compute the relevant elasticities that, according to 
the formulae, are time dependent. We report the elasticities for four periods: 1976-1981, 1982-
1985, 1986-1991, and 1992-1996. The two types of labor show a decreasing degree of 
substitutability. Own wage elasticities are negative.
23 For the 1992-1996 period their value is 
around –0.35 for skilled workers and –0.4 for unskilled workers. This means that a 10% 
reduction in wages is related to a 3.5-percent increase in the demand skilled and 4-percent 
increase in the demand for unskilled labor
24. Output elasticities are positive during the whole 
period but seem to have decreased with time. In particular a 1-percent increase in production is 




SEVEN METROPOLITAN AREAS 
  Table 5 shows the results of the estimation in the case of the demand for hours worked by 
skilled and unskilled labor (without capital) in the seven largest metropolitan areas.
26 Besides 
changes in relative prices, we added a demand shifter in the equation. In particular we introduced 
the investment rate for the urban economy into equation (2), in order to assess any possible 
changes in labor demand holding constant relative prices. 
                                                 
23 The change in the wage elasticies over the four periods of time considered here is statistically significant at 95% 
confidence level. 
24 The results using a CES function are somewhat different. In this case, a 10% decrease in wages is related to a 0.8% 
increase in skilled labor demand and a 1.7% increase in unskilled labor demand respectively.  Again, the two types of 
labor show increasing substitutability, just as in the case of capital and unskilled labor.  On the other hand skilled labor 
and capital are complements. These results are available upon request. 
25 The results when splitting up into two subsamples (after and before the reform) are statistically insignificant.   17
  Again, the Wald test rejected the null hypothesis so we estimated the bij's without 
symmetry restrictions. The coefficients turned out significantly different from zero, rejecting the 
existence of a fixed proportion technology. The estimated α i coefficient for skilled employment 
is positive and significant. This implies that skilled employment/output ratio increases as the 
scale of production is expanded (i.e. the production function is non-homothetic). Based on the 
estimated bij's we computed the relevant elasticities. The two types of labor show a decreasing 
degree of substitutability as can be seen in Figure 6. On average, the elasticity of substitution 
between skilled and unskilled employment was 0.93 between 1976 and 1996. 
  Own-wage elasticities are higher in this case than in the manufacturing sector. In 
particular, a 10% decrease in wages is related to a 4.5% increase in skilled labor demand and a 
5.1% increase in unskilled labor demand.
27 In the case of unskilled labor, the own-wage elasticity 
has increased in absolute value during the post-reform period to 0.51 from 0.46 in the pre-reform 
period. On the other hand, output elasticities are positive. A one-percent increase in output is 
related to a 1,8% increase in skilled labor demand and a one-percent increase in unskilled labor 
demand. Higher investment rates increase both skilled and unskilled labor demand. Yet, this 
effect has been slightly higher in the case of skilled employment. 
Finally, we estimated equation (1) adding a dummy for the post reform period (alone and 
interacted with the relative prices). The coefficients on these variables did not turn out 
significant. This means that the effects of the reforms are already captured in the changes in 
relative prices or in the demand shifter that was added to the equation. The results (not reported) 
on these regressions are available upon request.  
                                                                                                                                                             
26 Table 5 shows the results in which total labor costs (salary plus non-wage costs) are used as the relevant price. 
However the same exercise was performed using wages only, i.e., excluding non-labor costs. In this case, results are 
fairly similar.   18
 
6. DYNAMIC LABOR DEMAND 
The existence of adjustment costs of changing employment (net changes) and changes in 
firing and hiring (gross changes) implies that firms do not adjust instantly to changes in the 
variables mentioned in the previous section. To capture this issue, we estimated a dynamic labor 
demand equation that is derived in Appendix 2: 
t t t t t t t t t t u n nw w nw w y y c n + + + + + + + + = − − − − 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 ] [ ] [ γ β β α α  (6) 
where  n is employment, y is a rolling autoregression forecast of production, w is a rolling 
autoregression forecast of basic wages, nw are non-wage labor costs that do not affect the path of 
employment adjustment, and u is an error term. Non-wage labor costs include vacations, 
bonuses, health and pension contributions and payroll taxes (all added as % of basic wage). 
Alternatively, we also estimate equation 6 ignoring non-wage labor costs. In turn, γ t is a measure 
of the costs of adjustment, which depends on the regulations that affect the path of employment. 
Following Burgess and Dolado (1989) we interact different types of regulation with nt-1. In 
particular, we assume that:  
t t t R R 2 1 2 1 0 γ γ γ γ + + =  (7) 
where R1 denotes severance payments (expressed as a percentage of the basic salary) and R2 
denotes dismissal costs (indemnity for dismissal without just cause expressed in terms of the 
number of monthly wages for workers with 10 or more years in the firm
28). As mentioned in 
Section 2, severance payments fell as a result of the 1990 labor reform, while the indemnity for 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 The corresponding own-wage elasticities in the case in which wages (excluding non-wage costs) are used as the 
relevant price are 4.3% and 5.0%. 
28 This variable is taken as a proxy for dismissal costs for all workers. Although desirable, we were unable to redefine the 
dependent variable in order to measure employment of workers with 10 or more years in their current job only.   19
unjust dismissal increased
29. These two changes in the regulation should have had opposite 
effects on the costs of adjustment. The reduction in severance payments should have reduced the 
costs of adjustment (a reduction in γ t), while the increase in dismissal costs should have worked 
in the opposite direction. Importantly, the 1993 pension and health reform increased labor costs 
but should not have affected the costs of adjustment. 
This formulation is useful in order to assess the impact of a one-unit increase in the costs 
of regulations on the level of employment (the β ’s) and that of this increase in the cost per 
worker on the path of employment adjustment (the γ ’s). In the former case, we can infer the 
impact or short-run multiplier coefficient (β 0) and the long or equilibrium multiplier (β 0 + β 1)/(1-
γ t). Moreover, we can test whether these multipliers changed as a result of the structural reforms. 
This can be done as a quasi-natural experiment by including a post-reform dummy interacted 
with wages and the lagged employment measure. 
 
6.1. Econometric Results 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of equation (6) with aggregated quarterly 
data from the urban household surveys. In order to avoid potential endogeneity in the shocking 
variables, we used rolling-regression (i.e. continuously updated) forecasts of the product demand 
and wages instead of their actual values. In the case of output, the forecast is based on fourth 
order autoregression. Wages are forecasted with a third order autoregression
30. 
The first three columns show the results of estimating (6) for total urban employment. 
Unfortunately, we cannot include R1 and R2 in the same regression due to collinearity of the 
                                                 
29 However, the elimination of the right to sue for reinstatement with back pay should have reduced the expected firing 
costs. 
30 In both cases we chose the highest order with a significant coefficient.    20
variables. The results are of interest. The first three columns indicate that the product elasticity of 
employment is 0.57, while the wage elasticity is zero in the short run (impact) but –0.37 in the 
long run. The same regression was performed ignoring non-wage costs (available upon request). 
The estimated elasticities are practically identical. The results also suggest that the changes in the 
regulations did not have an impact on adjustment costs. In fact, the coefficient on lagged 
employment indicates that quarterly changes in employment are on average only 40% of the 
desired adjustment, irrespective of the changes in the regulation.  
The remaining regressions separate skilled and unskilled employment. The results 
suggest that output and price (in absolute value) elasticities are larger for skilled workers (also in 
the regression without non-wage costs). The costs of adjustment were not affected by changes in 
the regulations regarding severance payments and dismissal costs for either type of worker. 
Moreover, when a post-reform dummy was interacted with the wage variables the estimated 
coefficient did not come out significant. This result gives support to the point made in the 
previous section, suggesting that structural reform did not affect the price elasticity of labor 
demand. In this sense, structural reforms did have an impact on labor demand through its effect 
on relative prices alone
31. 
In sum, the results of this section suggest that regulations add to static labor costs rather 
than to the dynamics of employment adjustment. Therefore, in the next two sections we will 
revisit the static labor demand estimations, using micro data. Before we move in that direction 
we present the results of some simulation exercises based on the dynamic labor demand 
estimation. The simulations are illustrative of the effects of different changes that could be 
introduced to labor legislation. 
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6.2. Simulations 
In this section, we perform a simulation exercise in order to assess how changes in 
payroll taxes and labor costs affected employment growth in Colombia. For this purpose, we 
used equations (3), (4) and (5) in Table 6 to estimate what would have happened to employment 
had health and pensions contributions not been increased during the 1993 labor reform.  
Figure 7 shows the fitted value of employment according to the dynamic labor demand 
specifications presented in Table 6. Panel A shows the results in terms of total employment, 
while panel B and C report unskilled and skilled employment, respectively. As employment is in 
logs, the difference between the two lines represents the percentage change. According to this 
information also presented in Table A2, during the last quarter of 1996 total employment would 
have been 1.3% higher if health and pensions contributions had not changed during 1993.   
Similarly, unskilled employment would have been 1.85% higher and skilled employment 2.2% 
higher.  
Figure 8 depicts the results of a similar exercise. In this case we simulate what would 
have occurred if the 9% payroll tax had been eliminated in 1993. In this case, employment would 
have been 1.3% higher during the last quarter of 1996, compared to what actually happened. The 
figures for unskilled and skilled employment are 1.8% and 0.9%, respectively.  
 
 
7. LABOR DEMAND IN A PANEL OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS 
This section presents some results of the estimation of a homogeneous labor demand 
equation with a balanced panel of Colombian manufacturing firms. The panel was obtained from 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 Slaughter (1997) has found that labor demand has been growing less elastic over time in the U.S.   22
the Annual Manufacturing Survey (EAM) and includes 2570 firms throughout the period 1978-
1991
32. The total labor cost was obtained directly for the surveys by adding wages and other 
benefits (prestaciones). In the specification of the model we follow Bentolila and Saint Paul 
(1992). In particular, we estimate: 
it it it it it t i it t dy k p w n n ε α α α α α α α + + + + + + + = − 6 5 4 3 2 1 , 1 0       (8) 
where nit is the log total employment by firm i at time t, wit is the log of wage paid by the firm 
(including benefits) deflated by the producers’ price index (common to all firms), pit is the log of 
the price of intermediate goods consumed by the firm (also deflated by the producers’ price 
index), kit is the log of stock of capital, dyit is the growth rate in gross production by the firm, and 
t is a time trend. 
  The results are reported in Table 7. The first and second columns show the results of the 
estimation with least squares and instrumental variables, respectively. In the latter, we use the 
lagged values of employment and intermediate goods’ prices as instruments (both at time t-2), as 
well as the contemporaneous growth rate in government consumption and the stock of capital. 
The results confirm the negative but low value (in absolute terms) of the short-run wage 
elasticity of labor demand in the manufacturing sector (around -0.05). However, the long-run 
value of this elasticity is substantially higher in absolute terms (-2.27). The long-run elasticity 
with respect to other inputs’ prices is positive (1.36), suggesting labor and intermediate goods are 
substitutes in production. 
  Growth in gross output seems to have a statistically significant effect on employment. 
Indeed, the results of the estimation indicate that a one-percentage point increase in the rate of 
output growth results in a 0,24-percentage growth in employment. This result is in line with the 
                                                 
32 The dataset consists of annual observations at the firm level.   23
time series evidence of the previous section. In order to correct heteroskedasticity problems we 
controlled for fixed effects by adding 28 sectorial dummy variables to the equation. The results 
remained virtually unchanged. 
  Finally, we interacted the list of regressors with a dummy variable that captures 
differential responses to the business cycle. The dummy variable takes a unitary value when 
output growth for the firm is over 4% and zero when growth is below 2%. If the growth rate is 
between 2% and 4%, the assigned value at time t depends on growth at t-1.  
  The results suggest that the wage elasticity of labor demand decreases (in absolute terms) 
during expansions, while the elasticity with respect to the price of intermediate inputs increases. 
Thus, an increase in the cost of intermediate goods induces greater substitutability vis-à-vis labor 
during expansions than during recessions. Lagged employment shows the expected result, lower 
inertia in expansion, and the coefficient is highly significant. Lastly, the results suggest an 
asymmetric labor demand response to the business cycle conditions. The impact of output 
growth on employment is larger during recessions than during expansions. 
  In sum, labor demand elasticities derived from establishment data are lower (in absolute 
value) than the ones obtained with aggregate data for the manufacturing sector. This is true both 
in the case of own wage and output elasticities. The results of this section also indicate that the 
demand for labor is more elastic in downturns than during expansions. This could explain why 
unemployment rates rise very rapidly but take a long time to fall, a pattern that has been found in 
Colombia. 
 
8. LABOR DEMAND IN A PANEL OF 92 MANUFACTURING SECTORS   24
  This section estimates equation (8) using data from 92 industrial sectors (corresponding 
to the 4-digit CIIU classification) from 1978 to 1995. In this case, the log of value added replaces 
the growth rate in gross production. Total labor costs (wages plus non-labor costs) are used as 
the relevant price variable.
33 The results are presented in Table 8 were all the variables are in 
logs. The first column presents the basic equation estimated by ordinary least squares. The 
second column corrects fixed effects and the third column uses instrumental variables, where 
lagged values of employment, intermediate goods' prices (both at time t-2) and the stock of 
capital (at time t-1) as well as the contemporaneous values of the stock of capital and wages are 
the instruments.  
  The estimated real wage elasticity is higher (-0.6)
34 in absolute terms than the value 
estimated with the firm-level data. Using IV the long-run wage elasticity is –1.43. The elasticity 
with respect to input prices is on average -1.2 depending on the method of estimation. Contrary 
to the firm-level results, the negative sign suggests that labor and intermediate goods are 
complements in production. Value added has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
employment. According to these results, a one-percent increase in value added results in a 0.45 
percentage growth in employment. 
  Finally, the last three columns in Table 8 show the results when the basic equation is 
interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 from 1992 to 1995 (and 0 otherwise) in order to 
assess for possible changes in the coefficients after the implementation of structural reform. The 
coefficient on lagged employment indicates that employment has been more flexible since 1992 
(lower inertia). 
                                                 
33 The same exercise was performed using wages only as the relevant price. Results are virtually identical and are 
available upon request. 
34 This elasticity is equal to -0.61 in the case in which non-labor costs are excluded from labor costs.   25
On the other hand, the elasticity with respect to total wage seems to have decreased (in 
absolute value) after 1991. Similarly, the response of employment to changes in value added 
virtually disappeared during the post-reform period. The elasticity with respect to material prices 
turns out to be positive during the post-reform period, indicating that labor and intermediate 
goods are substitutes in production. Interestingly, the positive response of employment to the 
capital stock increased significantly after the new labor regulation was implemented. 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
  This paper has analyzed the determinants of the demand for labor in Colombia’s urban 
sector (seven largest metropolitan areas) using different sources of data. The main focus of the 
paper is to estimate the own-wage elasticities of labor demand in order to quantify the effects of 
payroll taxation on employment generation. This is a critical area for policy design, given the 
abnormal levels of unemployment that the country is facing.  
  Some have argued that the relevant elasticities are low, discouraging policymakers from 
undertaking major reforms. The common belief is that the efficiency gains associated with labor 
reform are relatively weak while the political costs of changing current labor legislation are very 
high. This paper argues that, quite on the contrary, the payoff of reducing labor costs is 
substantial. 
  In order to reach that conclusion, the paper analyses the impact of recent changes in the 
costs of employment and measures their impact on labor demand. The estimated wage elasticities 
are summarized in Table 9. Using the more reliable quarterly time series obtained from the 
National Household Surveys these elasticities range from –0.45 to –0.52, depending on the type   26
of labor. However, the elasticities fall (in absolute terms) when the estimation uses a dynamic 
framework. In this case, the long run own-wage elasticity is –0.37.  
In the case of the manufacturing sector the elasticities are somewhat lower. Using the 
time series data they range between –0,35 (skilled) and –0.40 (unskilled). In a panel of 91 
manufacturing sectors the estimated value is –0.6 (in the short run) and –1.43 (in the long run). 
These results change dramatically in a regression that uses establishment data. In this case the 
short run elasticity is only –0.05, although its long-run counterpart is –2.27.  
  Output elasticities are larger. In the static labor demand framework the estimates are 
close to 2 for skilled workers and 1 for unskilled labor. In the dynamic specification they are 1 
for skilled and 0.6 for unskilled employment. Again, the elasticities fall when panel data is used. 
  The paper also analyses the impact of changes in the regulations on adjustment costs. The 
conclusion is that changes in severance payments and costs of dismissal, associated with the 
1990 labor reform, did not affect the path of employment adjustment. Using this framework, we 
also conclude that structural reforms did not change the relevant elasticities. This means that the 
main effect of regulatory changes affected labor demand though their direct impact on labor 
costs. Since these costs have increased it is likely that the net effect of labor, health and pension 
reforms has been a reduction in employment generation. According to the estimated elasticities 
in the dynamic framework, an elimination of the 9% payroll taxes could result in a 1,3% increase 
in employment in the urban areas. Of course, the impact is much greater when the elasticities 
derived from the static exercise are used. In this case, a 10% reduction in labor costs could result 
in a 5% increase in labor demand.     
Using a panel of manufacturing establishments we also concluded that the wage elasticity 
of labor demand increases (in absolute terms) during contractions. The impact of output growth   27
on employment is also larger during recessions than during expansions. In this sense, we found 
an asymmetric labor demand response to the business cycle conditions. Lastly, we did not find 
evidence of a significant effect of structural reforms (i.e. trade liberalization) on the relevant 
labor demand elasticities. We conclude that the effects of reforms on labor demand were the 
result of changes in relative prices alone.   28
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Appendix 1. Generalized Leontief (GL) Cost Function 
The GL cost function can be written as: 
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where Q denotes output and pi is the price of input i (t is time). The function is homogeneous of 
degree one in prices and does not impose symmetry, concavity or homotheticity. Assuming 
price-taking behavior in factor prices and using Shephard’s Lemma one can derive cost-
minimizing input demand functions: 
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where Xi is the quantity demanded of input i. Factor demands can be expressed in terms of input-
output ratios: 
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Appendix 2. Analytical Framework for the Dynamic Labor Demand Estimations 
A Cobb-Douglas production function can be written as: 
(A4)      ) 1 ( α α − = t t t K AN Y  
where A denotes a technological parameter, L the level of total employment, K the capital stock 
and α  the proportion of employment in production. 
 
First order conditions can be written as:   32
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Expressing equation (A5) in logarithms: 
(A6)      t t t K N A W ln ) 1 ( ln ) 1 ( ln ln * α α α − + − − =  
Rearranging terms: 
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If lowercase letters denote logs, then (A7) is equivalent to: 
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An adjustment equation satisfies: 
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Rearranging terms: 
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Substituting (A9) into (A11): 
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We now suppose firms have rational expectations and  e
t n  satisfying the following condition: 
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where superscript e denotes expectations. Substituting recursively for  e
s t e − , we can obtain: 












where L is the lag operator.  Then (A13) can be rewritten as: 
(A16)  
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which is the estimated equation. Table 1
Urban employment shares
Sector Share in total Share of skilled workers Skilled / Unskilled
employment in total employment in total employment employment
1976 -  1991 1992 - 1996 1976 -  1991 1992 - 1996 1976 -  1991 1992 - 1996 1976 -  1991 1992 - 1996
Manufacturing 29.75 27.57 76.10 76.53 10.45 13.96 0.118 0.162
Electricity and gas 1.08 0.97 98.90 98.81 23.87 33.62 0.329 0.514
Construction 6.46 6.31 64.21 58.84 9.46 12.45 0.106 0.143
Retail, restaurants and  19.65 21.15 50.35 52.80 10.96 15.81 0.126 0.188
hotels
Transportation and  7.12 7.03 70.03 68.12 11.09 14.69 0.127 0.173
Communications
Financial services 8.48 9.47 77.36 79.23 30.10 37.95 0.443 0.615
Personal and Govt. Services 25.83 25.73 56.14 59.41 30.17 38.27 0.441 0.622
Total 98.36 98.23 62.66 64.06 17.63 23.28 0.218 0.304
Source:  NHS
Share of wage-earnersTable 2
Annual Average Growth in Total Real Labor Cost (%)
Sector Unskilled Employment (less than 12 years of education)
1977-1985 1986-1991 1992-1996 1977-1996
Manufacturing 1.80 -1.45 8.09 2.40
Electricity and gas 1.73 -0.20 10.93 3.45
Construction 3.03 -1.16 9.89 3.49
Retail, restaurants and  2.03 -1.08 8.08 2.61
hotels
Transportation and  2.23 -0.97 8.28 2.78
Communications
Financial services 1.11 -1.84 7.49 1.82
Personal and Govt. Services 1.58 -1.38 8.85 2.51
Total urban 1.65 -1.34 8.36 2.43
Sector Skilled Employment (12 years of education or more)
1977-1985 1986-1991 1992-1996 1977-1996
Manufacturing -1.96 -2.78 11.85 1.25
Electricity and gas 3.58 -2.34 15.58 4.81
Construction -0.32 0.55 13.41 3.37
Retail, restaurants and  -1.68 -0.59 10.04 1.58
hotels
Transportation and  0.73 -0.11 10.79 3.00
Communications
Financial services -1.38 -0.56 12.83 2.42
Personal and Govt. Services -1.14 -1.61 11.81 1.95
Total urban -1.63 -1.71 11.36 1.59Table 3
1988 1992 1996
Log (Wages)
Constant 10.0354 11.2707 12.0258
(576.90) (624.09) (670.16)
Education 0.044 0.0182 0.0181
(52.01) (30.54) (31.91)
Gender 0.1671 0.1688 0.1585
(23.45) (22.11) (20.18)
Experience 0.019 0.0185 0.0172
(24.37) (21.57) (20.36)
Experience
2 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002
(-20.53) (-21.43) (-18.80)
Dummy health 0.0628 0.1421 0.1838
coverage (6.84) (13.93) (18.63)
Health coverage* 0.2848 0.2342 0.1320
minimum wage (20.48) (15.52) (8.31)
Minimum wage -1.0045 -1.1018 -1.0907
(-107.65) (-106.29) (-99.55)
Agriculture 0.1267 0.1114 0.4358
(5.08) (3.73) (1.28)
Mining 0.1865 0.4505 0.2378
(4.13) (3.73) (3.90)
Electricity 0.0547 0.0398 0.1868
(1.45) (0.92) (4.32)
Construction 0.0874 0.0602 0.0733
(5.73) (3.64) (4.48)
Retail -0.0095 0.0367 0.0449
(-1.02) (3.61) (4.20)
Communications 0.0463 0.0751 0.0742
(3.14) (4.65) (4.66)
Financial Serv. 0.0951 0.1564 0.1545
(6.28) (9.78) (9.85)
Government Serv -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0413
(-0.00) (-0.09) (3.97)
Other Services -0.1665 0.1180 0.4188
(-0.43) (0.70) (2.38)
Barranquilla -0.0083 0.0193 0.0374
(-0.77) (1.72) (3.17)
Bucaramanga 0.0065 -0.0504 -0.0662
(0.55) (-4.05) (-5.23)
Manizales 0.0264 -0.0646 -0.1159
(1.59) (-3.67) (-6.77)
Medellin 0.0594 -0.0256 -0.0018
(6.63) (-2.50) (-0.18)
Cali 0.0508 0.0250 0.0189
(4.77) (2.15) (1.52)
Pasto -0.1405 -0.1943 -0.0781
(-9.22) (-12.38) (-4.87)
No. observations 29476 26900 25887
R2 0.5504 0.5526 0.5269
Mincer Income EquationTable 4
Constant Relative Production R
2 D.W.
prices
Skilled employment -0.7736 0.7984 1.0133 0.79 2.04
(-3.06) *** (2.72) *** (6.38) ***
Unskilled employment 1.2058 -0.2495 0.0670 0.23 1.94
(8.66) *** (-2.24) *** (1.15)
PRICE, INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITIES
1976-1981 1982-1985 1986-1991 1992-1996
Own-wage elasticities
ηee -0.593 -0.523 -0.431 -0.350
ηoo -0.487 -0.409 -0.390 -0.400
Elasticity of substitution
σeo 3.850 2.876 2.498 1.979
Output elasticities
εey 2.204 2.008 1.986 1.968
εoy 1.050 1.049 1.060 1.068
                              
o-unskilled employment, e-skilled employment, y-production
Employment in number of hours.
FACTOR DEMANDS:  GL Specification
MANUFACTURING SECTOR
1977:1-1996:4Table 5
Constant Relative Production Demand R
2 D.W.
prices Shifter
Skilled employment -0.8864 0.9243 0.7152 0.0882 0.92 2.24
(-3.41) *** (3.80) *** (11.57) *** (2.68) ***
Unskilled employment 1.3739 -0.485 -0.026 0.0665
(8.27) *** (-3.43) *** (-0.62) (2.66) *** 0.50 2.11
PRICE, INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITIES
1976-1981 1982-1985 1986-1991 1992-1996
Own-wage elasticities
ηee -0.755 -0.642 -0.507 -0.445
ηoo -0.573 -0.497 -0.461 -0.515
Elasticity of substitution
σeo 1.147 0.982 0.822 0.798
Output elasticities
εey 1.873 1.772 1.714 1.839
εoy 0.979 0.978 0.975 0.966
                              
o-unskilled employment, e-skilled employment, y-production
Employment in number of hours.
FACTOR DEMANDS:  GL Specification
TOTAL
1977:1-1996:4Table 6
Total E Total E Total E Skilled E Unskilled E Skilled E Unskilled E
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 -0.0364 0.2143 -0.1005 0.2143
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (-0.36) (4.18) *** (-1.96) ** (4.18) ***
Production t 0.5666 0.5666 0.5666 1.0237 0.6041 1.0250 0.6041
(2.84) *** (2.84) *** (2.84) *** (4.17) *** (2.95) *** (4.17) *** (2.95) ***
Production t-1 -0.0342 -0.0342 -0.0342 -0.1125 0.0365 -0.1123 0.0365
(-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.44) (0.18) (-0.43) (0.18)
Own Wages t 0.0175 0.0175 0.0175 0.0877 0.1224 0.0880 0.1224
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.74) (1.22) (0.74) (1.22)
Own Wages t-1 -0.1636 -0.1636 -0.1636 -0.2237 -0.0385 -0.2254 -0.0385
(-1.70) * (-1.70) * (-1.70) * (-1.81) * (-0.38) (-1.81) * (-0.38)
Other type of E Wages t 0.1215 0.1222 0.1211 0.1222
(0.98) (1.24) (0.98) (1.24)
Other type of E Wages t-1 -0.2538 -0.3684 -0.2563 -0.3684
(-2.05) ** (-3.70) *** (-2.07) ** (-3.70) ***
R1 t*Et-1 0.0334 -0.0680 0.0089
(0.73) (-0.92) (0.17)




Et-1 0.5760 0.6459 0.6095 0.4679 0.3025 0.4070 0.3211
(4.95) *** (5.39) *** (5.64) *** (4.11) *** (2.52) *** (2.43) *** (2.46) ***
R2 0.9790 0.9790 0.9790 0.9847 0.9699 0.9847 0.9699
DW 2.63 2.63 2.63 1.96 2.42 1.98 2.42
Number of observations: 75
R1: Severance Payments
R2: Dismissal Costs -0.3445755 -0.4125953 -0.3741357 -0.2555911 0.12028674 -0.2317032 0.12358227
Source: NHS
DYNAMIC LABOR DEMAND ESTIMATIONS
1977:02 - 1996:04Table 7
Labor demand estimation results
Firm level
Basic Model Interacted with BC
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
OLS IV OLS + Di IV IV + Di
Employment (t-1) 0.964 0.978 0.965 0.987 0.988
(526.20) (492.76) (476.46) (349.27) (331),.77)
Labor cost -0.050 -0.051 -0.062 -0.054 -0.070
(-18.19) (-17.76) (-19.08) (-17.86) (-20.13)
Price of materials 0.024 0.030 0.047 0.024 0.051
(3.78) (4.27) (5.15) (2.43) (3.83)
Capital Stock 0.025 0.018 0.027 0.015 0.018
(20.99) (14.38) (19.49) (8.60) (9.19)
Growth in production 0.245 0.243 0.242 0.262 0.263
(58.45) (56.22) (56.18) (40.88) (41.02)
Year -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(-2.24) (1.19) (1.91) (2.06)
Employment (t-1)*BC -0.022 -0.022
(-5.51) (-5.66)
Labor cost*BC 0.003 0.003
(2.06) (1.99)
Price of materials*BC 0.013 0.011
(0.99) (0.85)
Capital Stock*BC 0.009 0.009
(3.29) (3.44)
Growth in production*BC -0.063 -0.065
(-6.84) (-7.05)
Adj. R2 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
Di referes to the 28 sectorial dummies.Table 8
Labor Demand Estimations
Panel of Manufacturing Sectors
1978-1995
OLS Fixed Eff. IV OLS Fixed Eff. IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment (t-1) 0.7476 0.4417 0.5767 0.7791 0.5165 0.6119
(52.31) *** (21.48) *** (6.00) *** (62.47) *** (28.36) *** (7.48) ***
Total wage -0.2903 -0.1413 -0.6056 -0.2432 -0.2029 -0.4746
(-11.57) *** (-3.57) *** (-4.04) *** (-11.84) *** (-6.02) *** (-4.38) ***
Input prices -0.2208 -0.3755 -0.5197 -0.3068 -0.4986 -0.777
(-5.59) *** (-7.81) *** (-3.90) *** (-6.84) *** (-9.68) *** (-3.69) ***
Capital stock 0.0289 0.0212 -0.0198 0.0351 0.0595 0.0118
(2.85) *** (0.69) (-1.58) (4.52) *** (2.55) *** (0.93)
Value Added 0.2154 0.2953 0.4465 0.1777 0.2593 0.3683
(18.94) *** (22.12) *** (4.52) *** (17.77) *** (21.45) *** (4.71) ***
Year -0.0007 -0.0021 0.0001
(-0.48) (-1.25) (0.07)
D*Employment (t-1) -0.8045 -0.6102 -0.5939
(-26.50) *** (-20.28) *** (-5.77) ***
D*Total wage 0.1721 0.1424 0.4223
(5.29) *** (4.37) *** (1.75) *
D*Input prices 0.3620 0.4321 0.9379
(5.97) *** (7.12) *** (3.24) ***
D*Capital stock 0.9964 0.7764 1.0687
(29.64) *** (22.33) *** (5.73) ***
D*Value Added -0.1720 -0.1513 -0.4244
(-7.64) *** (-6.60) *** (-1.94) **
R2 0.9705 0.9763 0.9622 0.9825 0.9833 0.9778
Total number of observations: 1502
D is a dummy variable for the period 1992-1995
Basic Equation Structural ChangeTable 9
Skilled Unskilled Total Skilled Unskilled Total
Quarterly Time Series
(1976:1 - 1996:4)
- Static Labor Demand
   +Manufacturing -0.350 -0.400 1.968 1.068
   +7 Metropolitan Areas -0.445 -0.515 1.839 0.966
-Dynamic Labor Demand
   +7 Metropolitan Areas
          Estimated with total labor cost -0.255 NS -0.374 1.024 0.604 0.567
          Estimated with wages only -0.310 NS -0.395 0.999 0.597 0.522
Manufacturing Panel  Data (Annual)
   +2570 Establishments (1978-1991) -0.05 / -2.27 0.240
   +91 Sectors (1978-1991) -0.60 / -1.43 0.440
short run / long run
NS: not significant
Own-wage elasticity Output elasticity
Labor Demand Elasticities
Summary of ResultsFigure 1
Non-wage labor costs
(as % of wage)
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B. Unskilled Employment and simulated unskilled employment assuming no 


























































































































































C. Skilled employment and simulated skilled employment assuming no increases 














































































































































































































































































































B. Skilled employment and simulated skilled employment assuming


























































































































































C. Unskilled employment and simulated unskilled employment assuming



























































































































































(number of monthly wages)




20 20.5 26.8Table A2
Total Unskilled Skilled
employment employment employment
1993:2 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
1993:3 0.1% 0.5% 0.4%
1993:4 0.1% 0.6% 0.4%
1994:1 0.1% 0.4% 0.5%
1994:2 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
1994:3 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
1994:4 0.7% 0.2% 0.9%
1995:1 0.6% 0.8% 1.1%
1995:2 0.7% 0.8% 1.1%
1995:3 1.2% 0.6% 1.7%
1995:4 1.1% 1.0% 1.6%
1996:1 1.2% 1.9% 2.2%
1996:2 1.3% 1.4% 2.0%
1996:3 1.4% 1.0% 1.9%




1993:2 0.2% 0.2% 0.5%
1993:3 1.0% 0.6% 1.0%
1993:4 0.7% 1.2% 0.7%
1994:1 1.2% 1.4% 1.4%
1994:2 1.2% 1.3% 0.9%
1994:3 1.3% 1.8% 1.5%
1994:4 1.2% 1.1% 1.1%
1995:1 1.3% 1.8% 1.5%
1995:2 1.2% 1.9% 1.3%
1995:3 1.3% 0.9% 0.8%
1995:4 1.3% 1.4% 1.4%
1996:1 1.2% 2.0% 1.1%
1996:2 1.2% 1.4% 0.7%
1996:3 1.3% 0.9% 0.6%
1996:4 1.3% 1.8% 0.9%
Eliminating mandatory bonuses would be equivalent to eliminating 
payroll taxes
Source: Own calculations.
Case without increases in health
and pensions constributions
Case with elimination of
9% payroll taxes